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Transparency and Corruption: A General
Analysis
Michael D. Gilbert†
This essay makes two claims: transparency in government causes
the very corruption it aims to prevent, and the problem is universal.
Some scholars, mostly philosophers and social scientists, appreciate
the first point, but it has not caught on in law.1 Legal debates—on
campaign finance, for example—proceed almost universally on the as-
sumption that transparency deters corruption.2 Few people seem to
appreciate the second point. Scholars see the corruptive potential of
transparency in specific settings, like open ballots.3 In fact, the prob-
lem is general. Efforts to dampen corruption with transparency usual-
ly threaten to promote it.
The occasion for this essay is a symposium on The Wire, a televi-
sion show—and an arresting work of art and social commentary—
about drugs, cops, and kids in Baltimore. The show depicts transpar-
ency’s double edge. In one sequence, detectives use campaign finance
records to connect drug dealers to politicians.4 This represents trans-
parency at its best, with police following a trail of money to uncover
graft. In another sequence, Mayor Royce, under pressure from a chal-
† Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I am grateful to Jonathan
Masur, Richard McAdams, and members of the University of Chicago Legal Forum for including
me in their symposium on The Wire. For helpful comments I thank participants at the symposi-
um, Debbie Hellman, and Mike Livermore.
1 For a lonely counterexample, see Michael D. Gilbert & Benjamin Aiken, Disclosure and
Corruption, 14 ELECTION L.J. 148 (2015) (arguing that campaign finance disclosure can exacer-
bate corruption).
2 For recitations of the conventional view, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976)
(“[D]isclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”); Richard L. Hasen, Chill
Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. &
POL. 557, 572 (2012) (“In the post-Citizens United era, when the country will be increasingly
awash in money flowing through various organizations in order to hide its true sources, mandat-
ed disclosure can serve the important interest in deterring corruption . . . .”).
3 See infra Part II.A.
4 The Wire: Cleaning Up (HBO television broadcast Sept. 1, 2002) (Season One, Episode
Twelve).
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lenger named Carcetti, demands an end to people “riding the middle.”
Some contributors support Royce and (as a hedge) Carcetti too. Royce
demands that they support him alone. If they keep riding the middle,
and if he gets reelected, Royce threatens to cut them out of his next
administration.5
This behavior is akin to extortion, with the mayor saying, “sup-
port only me or else.” How will Royce know who supported only him?
He could ask his supporters if they acted loyally, or he could ask Car-
cetti to name his supporters. Of course, these strategies will fail. Sup-
porters will lie and Carcetti will refuse. Royce will know who support-
ed him because of campaign finance records. One tidy report,
publicized in the name of good government, will sort the loyalists from
the fence sitters. Foreseeing their unmasking, fence sitters will re-
spond to the mayor’s extortion. Police use transparency to fight crime
while the mayor uses transparency to commit it.
This story comes from television, but art imitates life. Real-world
examples have the same flavor. Consider James Huffman. He unsuc-
cessfully challenged an incumbent in a U.S. Senate race in 2010. Ac-
cording to Huffman, many people supported his candidacy but refused
to contribute to his campaign. They feared that disclosure would re-
veal their identities to the incumbent, whom they expected to win and
then punish them.6
Law and economics uncovers the driving logic: transaction costs.
Like ordinary bargaining, corruption comes with costs. Bad actors
have to connect with other would-be conspirators, negotiate deals, and
see them through. Corruption is more likely to succeed as transaction
costs decrease. Transparency lowers these transaction costs. Need a
city councilman sympathetic to developers? Need to know the going
rate for construction permits? Campaign finance records tell you who
developers support and how much they give. Need to verify a repre-
sentative’s vote before handing her a bag of cash? Check the voting
records or attend the meeting. By lowering transaction costs, trans-
parency greases the wheels of corruption. The logic extends far and
wide, from campaign finance to FOIA. It reaches beyond corruption to
black markets for drugs, child pornography, and other illicit products,
as explained below.
5 The Wire: Home Rooms (HBO television broadcast Sept. 24, 2006) (Season Four, Episode
Three).
6 See James Huffman, How Donor Disclosure Hurts Democracy, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704415104576250503491062220. For ot-her ex-
amples, see infra Part II.
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My claim is not that transparency7 only produces crime. The
claim is that transparency both deters and produces crime. Whether
the first or second effect dominates is an empirical question, and the
answer must vary by time and place. Thus, it would be foolish to take
a confident position on the effect of transparency in the abstract—and
that is my point. Many judges, scholars, and advocates celebrate
transparency’s crime-fighting potential without regard for its shadow.
The legal profession prides itself on careful reasoning, but here it has
fallen short. We should not abandon transparency, but we need alter-
native reasons to support it.
I. TRANSPARENCY AND TRANSACTION COSTS
A senator is willing to sell her vote on a lucrative defense con-
tract, and a crooked CEO is willing to buy it. To strike a deal, they will
have to exchange information, agree on a price, and follow through.
Will they bargain successfully—will corruption take place—or will
they walk away? To clarify unlawful bargaining, it will help to analyze
lawful bargaining first.
Imagine two people, the owner of a used car and a buyer who cov-
ets it.8 The owner values the car at $5,000, and the buyer values it at
$10,000. There is scope for a deal. A price of, say, $8,000 would make
both parties better off. The buyer would pay only $8,000 for a car he
values at $10,000, and the seller would receive $8,000 for a car she
values at only $5,000. Will the deal take place? The answer depends
on transaction costs. To strike a deal, the parties have to spend time
and resources meeting, sharing information, haggling over the price,
drafting a contract, and so on. Collectively these are transaction costs
of bargaining. Sometimes transaction costs are so high that they over-
take the benefit of the bargain. The buyer would not pay $8,000 to the
seller and burn another $8,000 on transaction costs to own a car he
values at only $10,000. This logic yields a proposition: bargaining is
more likely to succeed as transaction costs decrease.9
7 To be clear, I use the term transparency to mean public disclosure of actions (or failures to
act). I do not mean a requirement of reason giving. A reason-giving requirement can enhance
transparency by demystifying a decision-making process, and it might reduce corruption. Reason
giving is a separate and complicated topic. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94
VA. L. REV. 987 (2008) (summarizing the literature on reason giving by judges, the prudential
arguments for and against it, and developing a normative argument for candor in reason giving).
8 The premise of the following example is based on one in ROBERT COOTER& THOMASULEN,
LAW&ECONOMICS 74–76 (6th ed. 2012).
9 This is an implication of the Coase Theorem. For an approachable discussion, see id. at
81–86. For the original work, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
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Scholars divide transaction costs into three categories: search
costs, negotiation costs, and enforcement costs.10 Search costs refer to
the costs of finding a trading partner. Suppose the car buyer does not
know the seller. He must search for someone who owns the car he
wants, perhaps by scanning Craigslist or posting flyers. Negotiation
costs refer to haggling. The buyer and seller must agree on terms, in-
cluding price, and this involves strategy and bluffing (“the engine is
good,” “I won’t take less than $9,000”). Enforcement costs refer to the
costs of seeing the deal through. This could include drafting and sign-
ing a contract, checking the car for damage before the exchange takes
place, and so on. Decreasing these transaction costs facilitates bar-
gaining.
Return to the senator and the CEO. Their would-be bargain mir-
rors the car sale. The senator prefers the money to her vote, and the
CEO prefers the vote to his money, so there is room for a deal.11 How-
ever, to strike it they must overcome transaction costs. First, they
must find each other (search costs). This step is dicey. If the CEO
makes a corrupt proposal to the wrong senator, he could land in jail.12
Second, they must agree on terms (negotiation costs). What exactly
will the senator do? Vote for the bill, urge her colleagues to vote for it,
extoll the bill on the floor? And what will the CEO do in return? Make
a campaign contribution, deliver a bag of cash, hire the senator’s
nephew? Finally, the senator and CEO must find a way to enforce
their agreement (enforcement costs). Illegal contracts are void, so they
must rely on trust. The senator must convince the CEO that if he pays
today the senator will deliver the vote tomorrow. To strike a corrupt
deal, the parties must overcome these transaction costs.
Many transaction costs have a common source: private infor-
mation. One party has information the other party lacks. Private in-
formation frequently impedes bargaining. To illustrate, consider the
problem of search costs. Politicians and business leaders mingle at a
cocktail party. To secure his defense contract, the crooked CEO needs
to identify a corruptible official. The senator is corruptible and keen to
talk, but the CEO does not know this. Unsure of the senator’s princi-
ples, and wary of an attempted bribery charge, the CEO keeps his
10 See COOTER&ULEN, supra note 8, at 88.
11 Deals like this recur throughout The Wire. For example, in Season Five, Episode Ten,
Mayor Carcetti’s assistant proposes to reward the acting police commissioner with a state-level
position if the commissioner does not publicize information about an embarrassing police inves-
tigation. In the same episode we learn that the lawyer Maury Levy has paid an official to give
him confidential court documents. The Wire: -30- (HBO television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008) (Sea-
son Five, Episode Ten).
12 Federal law criminalizes attempted bribery. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Supp. I 2012) (Penal-
izing anyone who “directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value” to a
public official with intent to influence an official act) (emphasis added).
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mouth shut. The parties fail to connect; search costs are too high. Pri-
vate information is the cause. The senator knows she is corruptible,
but the CEO does not.
Consider negotiation costs. The senator and CEO found each oth-
er, and now they haggle. The senator will sell her vote for $50,000 or
more, but the CEO does not know this. The CEO offers only $10,000.
When the senator refuses, the CEO cannot tell if the refusal is sincere.
Maybe the senator will never accept $10,000, in which case the CEO
should raise his offer, or maybe the senator is bluffing and will even-
tually accept. The CEO assumes the senator is bluffing and sticks
with $10,000. The senator walks away. Private information—the sen-
ator knew her reservation price, but the CEO did not—caused bar-
gaining to fail.
Finally, consider enforcement costs. The senator agrees to support
the bill tomorrow, and the CEO promises to pay her afterwards. Will
the CEO keep his promise? A contract for corruption is unenforceable.
Without a contract, the parties must rely on trust.13 Can the senator
trust the CEO?He says he will keep his promise, but talk is cheap and
the senator is cautious. After the senator casts the vote, the CEO
might betray her. Fearing this, the senator quits the deal. The CEO
knew his own commitment to the deal, but the senator did not. Private
information blocked the bargain.
To summarize, private information raises transaction costs, im-
peding bargains.14 It follows that public information—meaning infor-
mation the parties share—must lower transaction costs, facilitating
bargains. Reconsider the scenarios above with public information. The
senator and CEO know that the other is corruptible, making it easier
to connect at the party. The CEO knows the senator will not accept
less than $50,000. Thus, he does not insult her with an offer of
$10,000, and she does not walk away. The senator knows the CEO will
keep his promise and pay tomorrow, so she delivers the vote today.
How do these ideas connect to transparency in government?
Transparency makes private information public. Transparency en-
sures that people know who attended the meeting, how they voted,
who testified, what they said, and who contributed what to whom.
13 In Season Four, Episode Eleven, of The Wire, Stringer Bell learns just how important
trust is. He paid Senator Clay Davis to bribe officials. In fact, Clay Davis “rainmade” him. As the
lawyer Maury Levy explained, “A guy says if you pay him, he can make it rain. You pay him. If
and when it rains, he takes the credit. If and when it doesn’t, he finds reasons for you to pay him
more.” Bell trusted Davis to pay bribes, but Davis simply kept Bell’s money. The Wire: A New
Day (HBO television broadcast Nov. 26, 2006) (Season Four, Episode Eleven).
14 Private information, which is also called asymmetric information, is a persistent source of
market failure and a common justification for regulation. See e.g., BARAK ORBACH, REGULATION:
WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES 404 (2013). Market failure is tantamount to failed bar-
gaining. See generally Coase, supra note 9.
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This sunlight permits monitoring of public officials. Monitoring deters
corruption just as patrol cars deter speeding. But sunlight does some-
thing else too. It lowers the transaction costs of corrupt bargaining.
II. LEGAL APPLICATIONS
I have explained the connection between transparency and cor-
ruption. The logic is general as befits a general problem. The following
pages apply the logic to a host of transparency initiatives. In public
voting, campaign finance, open meetings, and FOIA requests, trans-
parency comes with a double edge. I conclude by analyzing additional
and perhaps surprising topics like opioids, sex offender registries, and
the “Mugshot Racket.”15 Transparency, it turns out, fuels more than
corruption. It can fuel any crime that involves exchange.
A. Public Voting
Should voting for a representative happen privately or in public?
This question preoccupied nineteenth-century Britain.16 Public voting
was the common practice, and proponents claimed that it improved
accountability.17 John Stuart Mill argued that voters had a “moral ob-
ligation to consider the interest of the public,” and voting “under the
eye and criticism of the public” would make them take the obligation
seriously.18 According to Mill, transparency causes voters to act public-
mindedly, not selfishly. Whether this is the same as saying that
transparency deters corruption depends on one’s definition of corrup-
tion. Regardless, the logic runs the same way: transparency discour-
ages bad behavior by making people accountable.
Mill’s argument seems sound, but within a few years of making it
Britain adopted the secret ballot.19 Why? Because vote buying was
rampant.20 Crooked politicians offered voters money in exchange for
their support. Voters who accepted could easily prove their faithful-
ness: the politicians could watch them cast their ballots. Knowing that
they were watched encouraged voters to deliver their votes ex post,
15 See infra Part II.E.
16 See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 190 (1867)
(“The question of greatest moment in regard to modes of voting is that of secrecy or publicity[.]”).
17 See Allison R. Hayward, Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and Accountabil-
ity in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & Pol. 39, 45 (2010) (“People, and their politicians, criticized the [se-
cret] ballot as a way to cloak voters’ preferences and reduce accountability.”).
18 MILL, supra note 16, at 193.
19 Mill published his book in 1868. The secret ballot was adopted in 1872. See IAN MACHIN,
THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY IN BRITAIN, 1830–1918, at 78–82 (2001) (detailing the procedural histo-
ry of the new law from its introduction to enactment on July 18, 1872).
20 See id. at 74–83 (connecting the rise of the secret ballot in Britain to vote buying).
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which encouraged politicians to buy them ex ante. Britain adopted the
secret ballot to deter this corruption. The same reasoning led to adop-
tion of the secret ballot in the United States.21
Open voting lowers the transaction costs of corrupt bargaining.
Specifically, it simplifies enforcement by making otherwise private in-
formation—whether the voter voted as promised—public. Conversely,
secret ballots raise the transaction costs of corrupt bargaining, which
is why they were adopted. Jeremy Bentham put it like this: “Under
the régime of secrecy, the [vote] buyer could have no sufficient security
that the contract would be faithfully executed by the [vote] seller.”22
The connection between open voting and corruption extends to
representative bodies. In general, legislators vote publicly so voters
can monitor their behavior.23 Transparency promotes accountability to
the public, but it also lowers transaction costs of corrupt bargaining.
Returning to an earlier example, the CEO is more likely to buy the
senator’s vote if he can watch her cast it. As another example, consider
the Club for Growth, a powerful interest group. In 2013, the Club
warned that Senators’ votes on a health care program “will be listed
on the group’s congressional scorecard” and anyone supporting the
program “could be a target in future elections.”24 One can conceptual-
ize the Club’s warning as a corrupt offer: oppose the program for us,
and in exchange we will not oppose you. Open voting allowed the Club
to identify opponents of the program.
Bentham understood the downside of open voting by legislators.
He offered a proposition: “Votes ought to be given secretly in all cases
in which there is more to fear from the influence of particular wills,
than to hope from the influence of public opinion.”25 Translation: when
transparency causes more bad behavior than it deters, vote in secret.
As the quotes by Mill and Bentham suggest, the observation that
open voting can cause corruption is old.26 However, the underlying log-
21 See Hayward, supra note 17, at 50 (explaining that part of the impetus for the secret bal-
lot in the United States was the “vote bribery facilitated by non-secret voting”). The secret ballot
appeared to reduce vote buying. Without the promise of a payment, fewer people bothered to
vote. See generally Jac C. Heckelman, The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates, 82
PUBLIC CHOICE 107 (1995) (finding that the secret ballot decreased voter turnout by seven per-
centage points and attributing this to disruption in the market for votes).
22 JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 146 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999).
23 Voting by legislators can be private, public, or “semi-public,” as when votes are cast by
voice, outcomes are publicized, but the votes of individual legislators are not identified. For a dis-
cussion and historical example, see Jon Elster & Arnaud Le Pillouer, Semi-Public Voting in the
Constituante, in SECRECY AND PUBLICITY IN VOTES ANDDEBATES (Jon Elster ed., 2015).
24 Elise Viebeck, Club for Growth Issues Warning to Senate GOP, THE HILL (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/324253-club-for-growth-warns-against-senate-procedural-vo
te [https://perma.cc/CJ96-4B24].
25 BENTHAM, supra note 22, at 145.
26 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Open-Secret Voting, in SECRECY AND PUBLICITY IN VOTES AND
124 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2018
ic has not been generalized. The problem is not open voting; the prob-
lem is transparency.
B. Campaign Finance Disclosure
Most elections in the United States are privately funded. Individ-
uals donate to candidates and committees like super PACs, and that
money funds voter registration drives, yard signs, attack ads, and the
like. Private funding risks corruption.27 Donors may demand favors for
their support, and candidates may offer them. Various laws aim to
mitigate this risk,28 but they have deficiencies.29 In recent years, dis-
closure has emerged as a popular alternative.
Disclosure laws require individuals and organizations to publicize
their spending on politics. Federal law, for example, requires anyone
contributing $200 or more to a campaign to provide information—
name, address, the size and recipient of the contribution—that the
Federal Election Commission collects and publicizes.30 As the Su-
preme Court stated, “disclosure requirements deter actual corruption
and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contribu-
tions and expenditures to the light of publicity. This exposure may
discourage those who would use money for improper purposes . . . .”31
The light of disclosure surely deters corruption. Some corrupt
deals get canceled because the parties fear detection. But for other
parties, disclosure has the opposite effect: it promotes corrupt deals by
DEBATES 215 (Jon Elster ed., 2015) (stating “the major costs and benefits of both open and secret
voting are tolerably well understood” and then giving examples where open voting can deter or
facilitate corruption).
27 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (“[A] candidate lacking im-
mense . . . wealth must depend on financial contributions. . . . To the extent that large contribu-
tions are given to secure a political quid pro quo . . . the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined.”); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014) (“[T]he risk of cor-
ruption arises when an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or officeholder
himself.”).
28 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27–29 (upholding contribution limits on anti-corruption
grounds); id. at 25–27, 47 (noting that contributions can cause corruption and stating that coor-
dinated expenditures amount to “disguised contributions”); Michael D. Gilbert & Brian Barnes,
The Coordination Fallacy, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 399, 403–11 (2016) (reviewing law on coordinat-
ed expenditures).
29 See generally Michael D. Gilbert & Emily Reeder, Aggregate Corruption, 104 KY. L.J. 651,
657–60 (2016) (showing that lawful contributions can cause corruption and critiquing the Su-
preme Court’s decision to invalidate aggregate contribution limits); Gilbert & Barnes, supra note
28 (arguing that laws prohibiting coordinated expenditures cannot prevent much corruption).
30 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b) (describing information to be disclosed); id. at § 30112 (requiring the
Federal Election Commission to publicize disclosure information). The FEC’s searchable data-
base of disclosure information can be found here: https://classic.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/
norindsea.shtml.
31 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
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lowering the transaction costs of bargaining.32 Recall that transaction
costs divide into three categories: search costs, negotiation costs, and
enforcement costs. Disclosure lowers each one.
Start with search costs. Before corruption can take place, corrupt
actors must find one another. Disclosure makes this easier. Suppose a
real estate developer needs to buy a vote on the city council. Which
councilmember should he approach? Probably he should start with
someone sympathetic to his industry. Identifying a sympathetic coun-
cilmember is easy: he can consult disclosure records and see whom
other developers support. (Open voting and public records offer alter-
natives. The developer can identify a suitable councilmember by
checking voting records.)
Turning the scenario around, suppose a politician wants to extort
someone for campaign contributions. Where should she start? Disclo-
sure records seem promising. They tell her who is vulnerable, as a re-
cent controversy illustrates. In 2010, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes
Norton called a lobbyist and left a message stating that she was “han-
dling the largest economic development project in the United States”
and that her “major work on the committee and subcommittee has
been essentially in your sector.”33 Norton solicited that lobbyist be-
cause he had made contributions to other members of her committee,
and Norton was “frankly surprised” that she had not received one her-
self.34 How did Norton know about the lobbyist’s giving? Disclosure
records must have been her source.35
Consider negotiation costs. Corrupt actors must settle on the
terms of their deal including the price, where “price” might mean the
size of the contribution an actor makes to secure a politician’s vote.
Settling on the price may be difficult because the market for corrup-
tion is opaque. An Internet search shows the market value of a used
32 This point was developed in Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 1, at 153–59.
33 Hanna Siegel & John R. Parkinson, Dialing for Dollars: Democratic Rep. Asks Lobbyist for
Campaign Cash in Voicemail, ABC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Polit
ics/dialing-dollars-democratic-rep-asks-lobbyist-campaign-cash/story?id=11655808 [https://perma
.cc/J6QU-PEZS].
34 Id.
35 Norton might have learned about contributions to her Democratic colleagues through oth-
er channels. However, information about contributions to Republicans on her committee almost
certainly came from disclosure records. For more evidence of politicians using disclosure records,
consider the experience of a Washington lobbyist. After supporting a Democrat in an unsuccess-
ful congressional campaign, the lobbyist received a call from the Republican winner demanding a
contribution. The Republican wanted more than the lobbyist had contributed to the losing Demo-
crat because “[t]he late train is a hell of a lot more expensive than the early train.” Richard S.
Dunham et al., Shakedown on K Street, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 19, 2006),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-02-19/shakedown-on-k-street [https://perma.cc/79
PX-L38H]. The Republican could not have verified the lobbyist’s original contribution without
disclosure.
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car with particular characteristics (make, model, age), which simpli-
fies bargaining by narrowing the range of plausible prices. An Internet
search for the value of a senator’s vote does not provide similar infor-
mation—and may raise red flags. Disclosure offers an alternative. The
records reveal how much others have given to politicians, providing a
basis for negotiation. Consider Tom Delay, once a powerful member of
Congress. Delay kept a book with detailed information on “Friendly”
contributions to members of his party and “Unfriendly” contributions
to his opponents, the latter of which he would not have known about
without disclosure.36 He would show lobbyists requesting favors the
book and where they stood.37 Delay’s book was like a crude menu with
prices.38
Finally, consider enforcement costs. Illegal contracts are void, so
corrupt actors must rely on other methods to ensure that the other
side follows through. Before the Senator delivers her vote, she wants
to verify that the CEO contributed to the super PAC, funded the at-
tack ad, or contributed to the campaign of the Senator’s ally. Rather
than taking the CEO’s word for it, the Senator can consult disclosure
records. Assembled under penalty of law, they provide a credible win-
dow on the CEO’s spending.39 Of course, the Senator does not need to
verify if there is trust. Disclosure records can help the Senator and
CEO establish trust. He can point to a long record of support for com-
pliant politicians (“As you can see, I have contributed to politicians
who support my industry for years”). The record makes his promises
seem credible.
In sum, disclosure records lower all of the transaction costs of cor-
rupt bargaining. This facilitates exactly those quid pro quos that dis-
closure aims to prevent. To see the logic more clearly, consider the op-
posite of disclosure: anonymity. Suppose politicians did not and could
not know who gives what (if anything) to whom. Without this infor-
mation, they would not know whom to approach with corrupt offers or
how much money to demand. Most importantly, they could not verify
that a corrupt actor had made a contribution or funded an ad as he
promised. Unable to verify the quid, politicians are unlikely to deliver
36 See David Maraniss & Michael Weisskopf, Speaker and His Directors Make the Cash Flow
Right, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 1995).
37 See id.
38 See id. (“‘See, you’re in the book,’ DeLay said to his visitor, leafing through the list. At first
the lobbyist was not sure where his group stood, but DeLay helped clear up his confusion. By the
time the lobbyist left the congressman’s office, he knew that to be a friend of the Republican
leadership his group would have to give the party a lot more money.”).
39 This is an important point. Having “more-or-less neutral third parties like the FEC” com-
pile the disclosure information and attaching penalties to violations of disclosure laws makes
disclosure records credible in a way that politicians’ assurances are not. Michael D. Gilbert, Dis-
closure, Credibility, and Speech, 27 J.L. & POL. 627, 630 (2012).
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the quo. Anonymity stifles corruption.40 Conversely, disclosure pro-
motes it.
To repeat, my claim is not that transparency only promotes cor-
ruption. My claim is that transparency has cross-cutting effects. Dis-
closure deters some corruption by exposing it and simultaneously en-
courages other corruption by lowering transaction costs. On balance,
disclosure may reduce corruption by a lot or a little. Or it may increase
corruption. We do not know.
C. Open Meetings, Open Courts
Many states and localities have laws requiring government offi-
cials to conduct their business in public.41 State legislators, city coun-
cils, school boards, utility commissions—bodies like these usually
must open their doors while conducting hearings, taking testimony,
and deliberating. Open meetings laws have many justifications, com-
batting corruption among them.42 The logic takes the usual form:
transparency discourages illicit deals by exposing them.
Scholars have criticized open meetings laws for chilling delibera-
tion and compromise, discouraging careful analysis, promoting politi-
cal posturing, and the like.43 To my knowledge, however, no one has
argued that such laws can be self-defeating, but of course they can.
Openness can cause the very corruption it aims to deter.
At this point the argument is easy to develop. Corrupt actors have
to find each other and negotiate, and open meetings provide a mecha-
nism. Anyone can sit in the audience, observe the officials, and note
their interests, priorities, needs, and sympathies. More importantly,
open meetings simplify enforcement. Private actors are reluctant to
pay officials unless they can be confident of a favor in return. Open
meetings let them verify favors. They can watch as officials raise their
40 See generally Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Ano-
nymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998) (arguing that
donor anonymity would decrease corruption); BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH
DOLLARS (2002) (same). The differences between the work by Ackerman, Ayres and Bulow and
this section of the essay are described in Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 1, at 154–60.
41 Steven J. Mulroy, Sunlight’s Glare: How Overbroad Open Government Laws Chill Free
Speech and Hamper Effective Democracy, 78 TENN. L. REV. 309, 315–25 (2011) (summarizing
state and federal open meetings laws).
42 See, e.g., Asgeirsson v. Abbott, 696 F.3d 454, 461 (5th Cir. 2012) (closed meetings can “en-
courage fraud and corruption”); Charles N. Davis et al., Sunshine Laws and Judicial Discretion:
A Proposal for Reform of State Sunshine Law Enforcement Provisions, 28 URB. LAW. 41, 43
(1996) (noting that one purpose of sunshine laws is to “serve as a check on corruption”).
43 See, e.g., Mulroy, supra note 41, at 355–67 (critiquing open meetings laws); Keith W.
Rizzardi, Sunburned: How Misuse of the Public Records Laws Creates an Overburdened, More
Expensive, and Less Transparent Government, 44 STETSON L. REV. 425, 426–27, 433–54 (2015)
(same).
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pet concerns, lobby for action, support or oppose proposals, and so on.44
When regulators meet, industry sits in the front row.
If interest groups miss a meeting, other transparency measures
compensate. The groups can read the transcript from the meeting or
watch a rerun on CSPAN. A recent controversy illustrates. Members
of Congress add “earmarks” to spending bills to draw federal money to
their home districts. North Carolina’s delegation once secured
$500,000 for a Teapot Museum.45 Earmarks can implicate corrup-
tion.46 One earmark brought hundreds of millions of dollars to Alaska,
where politicians planned to spend it on bridges—including some that
would increase the value of their personal property.47 In 2007, Demo-
crats in Congress tried to discourage earmarking with transparency.
Their effort backfired:
Far from causing embarrassment, the new transparency has
raised the value of earmarks as a measure of members’ clout.
Indeed, lawmakers have often competed to have their names
attached to individual earmarks and rushed to put out press
releases claiming credit for the money they bring home.48
Transparency in earmarking, like coverage by CSPAN, lowered
transaction costs by opening a window to the legislative process. Pri-
vate actors could identify politicians prepared to insert earmarks
(search costs), politicians could identify the kinds of earmarks they
could wrestle from party leadership (negotiation costs), and they could
44 The Wire illustrates a version of this in Season Three, Episode Five. Councilman Gray
puts pressure on Commissioner Burrell during a public city council meeting. Councilman Carcet-
ti, who is trying to curry favor with Burrell, puts an end to Gray’s questioning in a way that Bur-
rell can observe. The Wire: Straight and True (HBO television broadcast Oct. 17, 2004) (Season
Three, Episode Five).
45 See Bill Marsh, Pork Under Glass? Small Museums and Their Patrons on Capitol Hill,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/30/weekinreview/pork-under-glass-
small-museums-and-their-patrons-on-capitol.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (reporting on the
controversy over the Sparta Teapot Museum).
46 See Edmund L. Andrews & Robert Pear, With New Rules, Congress Boasts of Pet Projects,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/washington/05earmarks.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (describing the “conviction of Representative Randy Cunningham on
charges of taking millions of dollars in cash and gifts in exchange for inserting earmarks for a
military contractor”).
47 See Michael Grunwald, A ‘Bridge to Nowhere’ An Overstuffed Highway Bill A Teapot Mu-
seum Pork by Any Other Name . . . , WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/archive/opinions/2006/04/30/a-bridge-to-nowhere-an-overstuffed-highway-bill-a-teapot-muse
um-span-classbankheadpork-by-any-other-name-span/b4038a46-632a-40f8-85c5-87c3d286d325/
?utm_term=.203ef9aa3fb0 (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (reporting that one of Alaska’s powerful pol-
iticians “just happens to own land” that will benefit from an earmark for road and bridge con-
struction).
48 Andrews & Pear, supra note 46.
117] TRANSPARENCY AND CORRUPTION 129
showcase their successful earmarks to interest groups (enforcement
costs).
Consider a different form of openness in government: public tri-
als. The Sixth Amendment grants accused criminals a right to a public
trial.49 Many other legal proceedings, and the records they produce,
are public as well. Open courts have many virtues, one of which is de-
terring corruption through exposure.50 But open courts can also pro-
mote corruption. Suppose a crime boss strikes a deal with a witness:
testify in favor of my accused lieutenant, and I will pay you. How can
the boss ensure that the witness keeps her word? By watching her tes-
tify, of course. Knowing that she is watched encourages the witness to
follow through, which encourages the crime boss to make the offer in
the first instance.
Deals like that may be more common in civil proceedings. Deals in
criminal proceedings probably look more like this: testify for me and
be safe, or, testify against me and suffer the consequences. Criminals
intimidate witnesses from the audience.51 Uncooperative witnesses
may pay a price, as when a witness to murder in Alabama was gunned
down minutes after his testimony.52 Foreseeing the consequence, wit-
nesses accept the implicit offer and keep quiet. This problem has
prompted lawmakers in Florida to push a bill that would shield the
identities of witnesses in public records.53
Deals among criminals and witnesses may not technically consti-
tute corruption, but they violate law and harm society for the same
reasons. Open courts promote such deals through the usual mecha-
nism: lowering transaction costs.
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
50 See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 677 (1996) (“In
a case of malicious prosecution—say, trumped up charges against a vocal government oppo-
nent—a public trial can expose corruption for all to see.”).
51 This is depicted in The Wire. In Season One, Episode One, drug dealers sit with other au-
dience members in the courtroom as two witnesses testify about a murder. One witness testifies
against the drug dealer on trial, and the other, who the dealers have paid, exonerates him. The
Wire: The Target (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002) (Season One, Episode One).
52 See Carol Robinson, Witness Murder Outside Alabama Courthouse could have ‘Chilling’
Effect, AL.COM (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/10/witness_
murder_outside_courtho.html [https://perma.cc/TQ2R-HE2N] (reporting the “brazen shooting
death of a man gunned down outside of a Montgomery courthouse minutes after he testified
against a violent crime suspect”). The same phenomenon is depicted in Season One, Episode One,
of The Wire. A witness testifies against a drug dealer. The dealer’s associates watch from the au-
dience. By the end of the episode the witness is dead. The Wire: The Target, supra note 51 (Sea-
son One, Episode One).
53 See Kristen M. Clark, To ‘Stop this No-Snitch Mentality,’ Murder Witnesses Could Be Pro-
tected, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/
state-politics/article131498089.html [https://perma.cc/LN2U-VBRC] (reporting on the bill).
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D. Public Records and FOIA
Votes, campaign contributions, name of witnesses—information
like this appears in public records, and it can facilitate corruption for
the reasons discussed. Many other types of information appear in pub-
lic records and raise the same problem. Property records, for example,
indicate who owns what where. Often, they indicate what the property
is worth. This information provides social benefits—homeowners, for
example, can compare their property assessments to others and con-
firm that the tax authorities are treating them fairly. But property
records can also facilitate extortion.
To see the logic, consider the Fetcher Bill Hypothesis.54 In brief,
that hypothesis states that lawmakers seek wealthy interests, threat-
en them with wealth-destroying regulation, then drop their threats
when the wealthy interests pay up.55 This is extortion at its finest.
How do lawmakers identify wealthy interests to target? At the nation-
al or state level they can rely on common sense. General threats to
banks, pharmaceuticals, or insurers will send wealthy interest groups
scrambling.56 At the local level, where lawmaking authority is limited,
general threats may not work. Lawmakers need to identify specific
wealthy interests and target them. Property records can help: who
owns the property next to the river, and what is it worth? In other
words, how much would the owner pay us not to regulate it?57
Apart from real property, public records include all kinds of in-
formation that could facilitate corruption: construction permits, liquor
license applications, zoning requests, and the list goes on.
The records addressed so far are usually collected and publicized
as a matter of course. Other records are collected on an ad hoc basis.
Freedom of information laws, both federal and state, permit individu-
als to request particularized information from the government, which
they can keep for themselves or publicize. Such laws have exposed bad
behavior, like rampant corruption in the city of Bell, California.58 All
54 See David Lowery et al., Organized Interests and Political Extortion: A Test of the Fetcher
Bill Hypothesis, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 368, 369–72 (2005) (describing the Hypothesis). The Hypothesis
grows largely from ideas in FRED. S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
55 See Lowery et al., supra note 54, at 369–72.
56 Id. at 370–71 (discussing how politicians identify targets for extortion).
57 For evidence of this kind of corruption, see, e.g., Jim Shay, Zoning Official Sentenced for
Extorting Bribes, CTPOST.COM (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Zoning-official-
sentenced-for-extorting-bribes-6882233.php [https://perma.cc/P85F-F2S5] (reporting on a zoning
official who identified inspection targets and then demanded payments to inspect favorably).
58 See Daniel Skallman, Public Record Request Reveals Corruption in City Government,
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Sep. 28, 2010), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-me
dia-law-resources/news/public-record-request-reveals-corruption-city-government [https://perma
.cc/44F5-9S4D] (describing the role of FOIA in uncovering wrongdoing in Bell, California).
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things considered, such laws might reduce corruption.59 But in some
instances they can exacerbate it.
Who uses FOIA, the federal freedom of information law? In 2013,
nearly 80 percent of FOIA requests were “commercial” in nature.60
Government contractors, lawyers, lobbyists—sophisticated actors like
these collect and use information on “activities of regulators, competi-
tors, customers, or markets.”61 Presumably most requestors use this
information in law-abiding ways. But in some cases they might not.
Information on the inner workings of government is like information
gleaned from public votes, open meetings, and campaign finance rec-
ords: it can lower the transaction costs of corrupt bargaining. To
demonstrate, consider allegations against Tim Golden, a city council-
man in Pekin, Illinois.62 Golden used a freedom of information law to
get a park district’s reports on its compliance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act.63 Golden allegedly studied the reports, identified in-
stances of non-compliance, and demanded favors from the park dis-
trict’s director in exchange for keeping quiet.64 Without FOIA, Pekin’s
corrupt offer—favors for silence—would not have been possible.
E. Transparency and Other Crimes
Corruption involves bargaining, but so do drug deals, prostitution,
and other crimes. The logic above applies to these settings. In a broad
range of black markets, transparency can grease the wheels of illegal
exchange. The following paragraphs demonstrate.
1. Tainted drugs
Thousands of people die every year from drug overdoses. In 2016,
one particular drug, fentanyl, killed hundreds of residents of Balti-
more.65 In some cases, people died from tainted drugs. They consumed
59 See generally Adriana S. Cordis & Patrick L. Warren, Sunshine as Disinfectant: The Effect
of State Freedom of Information Act Laws on Public Corruption, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 18 (2014)
(presenting evidence that freedom of information laws increase corruption conviction rates in the
short term and may deter corruption in the long term).
60 See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1112 (2017) (describing FOIA usage).
61 Id. at 1113.
62 See Sharon Woods Harris, Pekin City Councilman Tim Golden Accused of ‘Blackmail’ in
Bike Trail Flap, JOURNALSTAR (July 17, 2014), http://www.pjstar.com/article/20140717/NEWS/
140719274 [https://perma.cc/UW77-DAQ5].
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See Luke Broadwater & Alison Knezevich, Baltimore Launches ‘Bad Batch’ Text-Alert Sys-
tem for Overdoses, BALT. SUN (Aug. 18. 2017) (reporting that fentanyl killed 419 people in Balti-
more in 2016).
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fentanyl when they thought they were consuming less lethal drugs
like cocaine or heroin. To mitigate the problem, the community intro-
duced “Bad Batch Alert,” a text-messaging service.66 When drug over-
doses spike in a particular neighborhood, users get a text warning
them away. The city’s health commissioner supports the service, argu-
ing, “The more information we can get out to the most people as fast
as we can, the better.”67
Bad Batch Alert discourages some drug transactions by exposing
their harmfulness. But that same transparency comes with a cost. The
former director of the Baltimore County Office of Substance Abuse
pinpointed it: “An addict will spend all day searching for the best,
most powerful dope on the street. That’s what they want, that’s what
they’re looking for. Baltimore City is now saying, ‘We’ll tell you where
it is.’” 68 He called Bad Batch Alert a “pied piper of heroin.”69 I would
characterize the service more simply: it lowers search costs.
2. Sex offender registries
Community notification laws require people convicted of child
pornography crimes to provide information about themselves, includ-
ing their home addresses, in public databases.70 The purpose of such
laws is deterrence.71 Community members can keep an eye on the of-
fender. If a sex crime happens near an offender’s home, investigators
have a plausible place to start. As with other forms of transparency,
offender registries aim to deter bad behavior by increasing the likeli-
hood of getting caught. Unfortunately, those same registries can, at
least in theory, do more harm than good. According to Professor J.J.
Prescott,
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 For the institutional affiliation of Mike Gimbel, the source of the quote, see id. For the
quote itself, see Kim Dacey, City Launches Texting App to Alert about ‘Bad Batches’ of Drugs,
WBAL-TV 11 (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.wbaltv.com/article/city-launches-texting-app-to-alert-
about-bad-batches-of-drugs/12091801 [https://perma.cc/58YN-UFSR]. A similar problem materi-
alized ten years earlier. When authorities in Philadelphia issued warnings about a deadly drug,
addicts were “intrigued by the possibility of a powerful new high.” The warnings helped “fuel
demand,” with addicts saying “stuff so strong that it kills is impossible to resist.” Associated
Press, Junkies Seek Out Deadly Batch of Heroin, NBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.nbc
news.com/id/12483293/ns/health-addictions/t/junkies-seek-out-deadly-batch-heroin/ [https://perm
a.cc/VT6S-662E].
69 Dacey, supra note 68.
70 See J.J. Prescott, Child Pornography and Community Notification: How an Attempt to Re-
duce Crime Can Achieve the Opposite, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 93, 93–95 (2011) (describing commu-
nity notification).
71 See id. (explaining the purpose of community notification).
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Web registries may essentially provide a contact list for indi-
viduals who wish to learn more about child pornography. . . .
[M]ore worryingly, a Web registry offers a shortlist of individu-
als potentially willing and able to supply child pornography di-
rectly and perhaps in person. . . . Counterintuitively, therefore,
subjecting child pornography offenders to community notifica-
tion requirements may enable rather than obstruct the growth
and development of the illegal child pornography market.72
This a story about transaction costs.73 Consumers of child pornog-
raphy need to connect with producers and distributors, and vice versa.
Registries can make that easier.
3. Mugshot Racket
The state maintains arrest, booking, and other criminal infor-
mation on just about everyone who interacts with the criminal justice
system.74 In general, this information is accessible to the public, in-
cluding on the Internet.75 In recent years, companies have begun
scraping mugshots from states’ online databases.76 They post them on
private websites and tag them, making the mugshots appear promi-
nently in, for example, Google search results.77 Then the companies of-
fer to remove the mugshots from their websites for a fee.78 This is the
“Mugshot Racket,” and it looks suspiciously like extortion.79 The com-
panies are offering people a deal that many cannot refuse: pay us, and
72 Id. at 96.
73 Prescott puts it in exactly these terms. See id. (discussing potential criminals’ “transac-
tions costs of figuring out how to enter the child pornography market”).
74 See generally James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availabil-
ity of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177 (2008) (documenting the prolifera-
tion and dissemination of criminal history records).
75 Id. at 207 (“An increasing number of states are making it easier for any person, for any
purpose, to obtain anyone’s criminal record. A 2006 SEARCH (National Consortium for Criminal
Justice Information and Statistics) survey found that twenty-five of thirty-four responding states
made name-only searches of criminal history records available to the public. Fifteen states al-
lowed searches by means of telephone, mail, or website queries, and ten states provided for
searches of court records.”) (internal citations omitted).
76 Allen Rostron, The Mugshot Industry: Freedom of Speech, Rights of Publicity, and the
Controversy Sparked by an Unusual New Type of Business, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1321, 1323
(2013) (“The companies that operate mugshot businesses ‘can use screen-scraping programs to
expeditiously snag every new and old mug shot from a department’s system, and then post them
to their own sites.’”) (internal citation omitted).
77 Id. at 1323–24.
78 Id. at 1324–25 (describing companies charging $399 to remove mugshots from company
websites).
79 Michael Polatsek, Extortion Through the Public Record: Has the Internet Made Florida’s
Sunshine Law Too Bright?, 66 FLA. L. REV. 913, 913 (2015) (“This scheme is known as the Mug-
shot Racket.”).
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we will not embarrass you. This situation is roughly analogous to the
one involving Congresswoman Norton, who apparently used campaign
finance records to single out a lobbyist and pressure him for a contri-
bution. Is the Mugshot Racket illegal? People have sued,80 but the
companies have a pretty good defense. The information on their sites
is already publicly available; transparency laws enacted in the name
of good government make it so. These companies are simply doing
their part to disseminate it.81
III. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing has implications for three overlapping audiences:
scholars, policymakers, and lawyers. For scholars the contribution lies
in the generality of the argument. The state cannot deter corruption
without information—who gave what to whom and why. At the same
time, bad actors cannot engage in corruption without information—
who is buying, who is selling, and who can be trusted. Transparency
supplies information to all players in the game. Thus, it has cross-
cutting effects. Transparency deters some corrupt acts while promot-
ing others, just as oxygen kills some bacteria while nourishing others.
Like end points of a two-way street, sunlight and black markets are
inextricably linked.
Scholars appreciate this point in the context of public voting for
representatives. Since at least Bentham we have understood that open
ballots lead to bought votes. What scholars do not seem to appreciate
is that the logic operates across the board, from open meetings to open
courthouses and earmarks. Publicity in these areas creates the same
problem as publicity in voting, and for the same reason.
This generalization provides a new way to think about and study
transparency. It connects things, like FOIA and drug markets, that
otherwise seem disparate. It exposes contradictions in received wis-
dom. Why, for example, do many election law scholars accept the se-
cret ballot while expressing unbridled support for campaign finance
disclosure? The purest scholarship seeks truth, and finding truth re-
quires resistance to dogma and group think.
Separate from scholarship, there are lessons here for policymak-
ers. The obvious lesson is that more transparency can backfire. An in-
80 See Becky Yerak, Lawsuit: Mug shot website posts incomplete records so sister site can so-
licit ‘takedown’ fees, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-
mug-shot-websites-0312-biz-20170310-story.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (describing a class-
action lawsuit against mugshot websites).
81 See Polatsek, supra note 79, at 918 (“Owners of these new mugshot websites claim that
they provide a public service by facilitating the dissemination of publicly available information of
interest to law-abiding members of society.”).
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crease in transparency creates a marginal benefit by deterring some
corruption and also a marginal cost by facilitating other corruption.
Transparency laws should broaden until the marginal benefit just
equals the marginal cost. The optimal degree of transparency might be
achieved surprisingly quickly. A little sunlight might disinfect better
than a lot.
This reasoning is general and insightful in the abstract. Of
course, one might question its usefulness in practice. Often we cannot
measure marginal benefits and costs, so we cannot tell when a trans-
parency law is optimized. This is a meaningful limitation, but it does
not doom this project any more than it dooms countless other theoreti-
cal works. We cannot measure a phenomenon without first identifying
it. Identification often begins with a good theory. Furthermore, miss-
ing data does not absolve policymakers (including judges) from their
responsibilities. Without data they rely on intuitions, and this project
sharpens intuitions. To prove the point, consider some contemporary
controversies. Should voters be permitted to post “ballot selfies”—
pictures of themselves with their completed ballots—online?82 Should
the White House release its visitor logs?83 To stop fake news, should
Facebook tell users when a Russian network is behind a story?84 “Yes”
is a common response. This analysis makes us think twice.
The lesson for policy runs deeper yet. Transparency deters corrup-
tion when it gives law enforcement new and useful information. Call
this the “deterrence effect.” Transparency promotes corruption when it
gives bad actors new and useful information. Call this the “abetting
effect.” When both effects operate, transparency might help or hurt
depending on the relative magnitudes. Sometimes, however, only one
effect operates. Imagine a city run by a tight-knit political class of re-
peat players. Everybody knows everybody else, positions and priorities
are clear, and trust levels are high. Meanwhile, law enforcers and lo-
82 See, e.g., Katie Rogers, Can You Take a Voting Selfie? States Wage Legal Battles Days Be-
fore Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/us/politics/voting-
selfie.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (describing the issue). For a recent case on the topic, see
Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2016) (invalidating a ban on ballot selfies).
83 See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, White House to Keep Its Visitor Logs Secret, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/us/politics/visitor-log-white-house-trump
.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (“The White House announced Friday that it would cut off public
access to visitor logs revealing who is entering the White House complex and which officials they
are meeting, breaking with the Obama administration’s practice and returning a cloak of secrecy
over the basic day-to-day workings of the government.”).
84 See, e.g., Adam Entous et al., Obama Tried to Give Zuckerberg a Wake-Up Call over Fake
News on Facebook, WASH. POST (Sep. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/obama-tried-to-give-zuckerberg-a-wake-up-call-over-fake-news-on-facebook/2017/09/24/
15d19b12-ddac-4ad5-ac6e-ef909e1c1284_story.html?utm_term=.c798309585dc (last visited Apr.
3, 2018) (discussing a Russian “disinformation” campaign that spread through Facebook during
the 2016 presidential campaign).
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cal journalists are resource-poor. In this environment, additional
transparency will have little or no abetting effect. Bad actors already
have the information they need. Additional transparency will, howev-
er, have a deterrence effect. Here transparency can only decrease cor-
ruption.85
The opposite scenario could arise. A city could feature sophisticat-
ed journalism and well-staffed enforcement agencies. Politics, howev-
er, might be messy, with unorganized parties, competitive elections,
term limits, and so on. Additional transparency might have little or no
deterrence effect but a meaningful abetting effect. Now transparency
can only increase corruption. Reasoning like this provides intuitions
about when more transparency is a good or bad idea. It replaces uni-
versal prescription with a sharper, contextual approach.
Finally, the analysis has implications for courts. Many cases in
many areas involve objections to transparency. In politics, some liti-
gants oppose mandatory disclosure of their contributions and expendi-
tures.86 Others oppose disclosure of their support for ballot initia-
tives.87 Some accused criminals oppose journalists in the courtroom,
and some officials oppose the public at their meetings.88 Often courts
uphold transparency laws, reasoning that they deter corruption or
have similar salutary effects.89 This project casts doubt on all of that
logic. Courts cannot in good faith uphold laws on anti-corruption
grounds if, in fact, those laws make corruption worse.
How to address this tension? Courts could change the terms of the
debate. Instead of tying transparency to corruption, they could tie it to
a different social value. What might that be? In campaign finance,
courts justify some disclosure laws on the ground that they prevent
the appearance of corruption.90 I object to this approach because the
85 Cf. Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 1, at 158–60 (developing this logic for campaign finance
disclosure); BENTHAM, supra note 22, at 148 (condemning “demi-publicity,” a state in which as-
sembly members know each other’s votes but the public does not).
86 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–84 (1967) (analyzing challenges to disclosure of
contributions and expenditures).
87 See generally Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (involving a challenge to a state law requir-
ing public disclosure of signatures on a ballot initiative petition).
88 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (rejecting a defend-
ant’s effort to exclude media from a courtroom); State ex rel. Krueger v. Appleton Area Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 898 N.W.2d 35 (Wis. 2017) (rejecting a school district’s argument that its commit-
tee’s meeting was not subject to the state’s open meetings law).
89 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–84 (upholding disclosure laws in part on anti-corruption
grounds); Reed, 561 U.S. at 199 (holding that disclosure of signatures helps preserve “the integri-
ty of the electoral process”).
90 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (“disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and
avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light
of publicity”) (emphasis added).
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effects of disclosure on appearances are uncertain.91 Courts justify
other disclosure laws on informational grounds. The claim is that dis-
closing who spends what provides valuable information to voters, re-
gardless of whether corruption is involved.92 Again, I object. For rea-
sons described elsewhere, disclosure might reduce voter information
rather than enhance it.93 In a recent, valuable paper, Professor Kate
Shaw suggests that disclosure laws could be justified by an “accounta-
bility” interest.94 I support her effort to reframe the debate but disa-
gree with her language. It is hard to argue that transparency laws
promote accountability to the public when they might produce corrup-
tion.95
If we are serious about deterring corruption, then changing the
terms of the debate will not work. Courts must confront the problem
directly. They must reconsider the constitutionality of transparency
laws, taking a hard look at their likely effects and invalidating laws
that seem unlikely to achieve their corruption-fighting purpose.96 This
is a tall order. Courts are not blind to appearances or immune to pres-
sures. An effort to shroud the workings of government could prompt a
damaging public backlash. No judicial opinion, however stirring, is
likely to persuade the mass of citizens that opaque governance works
best. Nevertheless, if deterring corruption is the goal, this is the only
defensible approach.
91 As a conceptual matter, there is disagreement about what constitutes corruption, let alone
its appearance. See, e.g., Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 103 (2014) (discussing variants of corruption). As an empirical matter, one study found
little connection between perceptions of corruption and campaign finance laws. See generally Na-
thaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public
Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2004). Finally, the argument
developed in Parts I and II, supra, creates a potential paradox: disclosure laws could improve the
appearance of corruption while worsening the reality of corruption.
92 See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff,
98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1858–61 (2013) (describing the information interest).
93 The argument runs as follows. If disclosure laws chill political speech as courts and most
commentators assume, then an information tradeoff arises: voters gain information by learning
the sources of some speech acts but simultaneously lose information because some speech acts
that would be informative are chilled and thus never observed by voters. The net effect could be a
reduction in voter information. See id. at 1862–70 (developing this logic).
94 See Katherine Shaw, Taking Disclosure Seriously, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA (Apr.
3, 2016), https://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/taking-disclosure-seriously [https://perma.cc/M4S7-RR3
2].
95 Likewise, it is hard to argue that they promote accountability when they might reduce
voter information. See generally Gilbert, supra note 92.
96 To illustrate, the state justifies some campaign finance disclosure laws on the ground that
they deter quid pro quo corruption, and federal courts accept this justification despite First
Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67–84 (finding the government’s
interest in deterring corruption and its appearance sufficient to sustain disclosure laws chal-
lenged under the First Amendment). If a given disclosure law does not actually deter corruption,
then the state’s interest weakens, and the constitutionality of the law becomes suspect.
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The news is not all bad. Yes, transparency raises a tragic tradeoff,
and that justifies heightened judicial review. But heightened review
could force lawmakers to put more thought into their transparency in-
itiatives, reasoning carefully instead of relying naively on the “sun-
light as disinfectant” trope.97 This could reduce corruption. More im-
portantly, acknowledging transparency’s limits could open new
avenues for reform. In recent years, the Supreme Court has invalidat-
ed limits on money in politics, reasoning that disclosure laws provide
sufficient protection against corruption.98 This is naive. Disclosure
might create more corruption than it deters. As the legal and policy
case for transparency weakens, the case for other corruption-fighting
measures—caps on political spending, public financing of elections,
and so on—grows stronger.
97 See LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914) (“Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant; electric light the most effective policeman.”).
98 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459 (invalidating aggregate contribution limits
and stating, “disclosure of contributions minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign fi-
nance system . . . [and] may also ‘deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corrup-
tion’”) (citations omitted); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (invalidating bans on
independent expenditures and stating, “prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide share-
holders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials ac-
countable”).
